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Abstract
We give proofs of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems after Joyal. The proof uses internal category
theory in an arithmetic universe, a predicative generalisation of topoi. Applications to Löb’s Theorem
are discussed.
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1 Introduction
This article concerns an alternative proof of the first Gödel Incompleteness theorem in the language
of category theory due to André Joyal, relying crucially on his newly introduced notion of ’Arithmetic
Universe’.
In 1973 Joyal lectured on his new proof, and a set of notes were circulated among a small group of
workers in topos theory. Unfortunately, the proof has never been made publicly available. This document
means to remedy this gap in the literature. Additionally, we will try to indicate how the proof using
arithmetic universes is related to the traditional proof. We will also detail a version of Lob’s theorem.
The Gödel Incompleteness theorem remains without a doubt one of the high points of 20th century
Mathematics. Gödel’s brilliant insight was the notion of arithmetication, simultaneously straightforward
and profound. Straightforward, for the construction is a simple if occasionally finicky exercise in
encoding various symbols and axioms, yet profound for it allows formal systems of mathematics to speak
about themselves. This self-reflective ability of formal systems has become a defining feature of many later
advances in mathematical logic.
As mentioned, Joyal’s alternative proof is based chiefly on the notion of ’Arithmetic Universe’ a
generalisation of the notion of a topos. Joyal constructs the initial Arithmetic Universe U using ideas from
primitive recursive arithmetic. This construction is explicit and may be repeated within the Arithmetic
Universe U0. This uses the fact that Arithmetic Universes have enough structure to interpret many
constructions that may be performed in Set. A more refined treatment would say that the internal
language of U is a sufficiently expressive type theory - we will say more on this later. The rest of the
argument then relies on manipulating a categorical incarnation of the Godel sentence constructed from
U in U .
Definition 1.1. An arithmetic universe is a list-arithmetic pretopos. That is, a category with finite limits,
stable disjoint coproducts, stable effective quotients by monic equivalence relations and parameterized
list-objects.
Quite a mouthful! Roughly, the first two conditions will allow us to do a large number of basic
mathematical constructions; in the internal language it provides for conjunction ∧, disjunction ∨, truth >
and the falsum ⊥. The third condition allows for quotients by equivalence relations; logically it adjoins
an existential operator ∃. 1 The final condition, requiring list-objects will allow for the use of (primitive)
recursion. The explicit construction by André Joyal of the initial model U0 of arithmetic Universes uses
techniques of primitive recursive arithmetic, bringing in the ability to ’code’ various mathematical objects.
The category U is build in stages. First, one starts with the initial ’Skolem theory’ Σ0, in effect a category
whose objects are all products ofN. This rather simple category has an internal language, that corresponds
to register machines: a programming language where one has an infinite amount of memory states, and
one can increase them by 1, set them to 0, or loop over a command. The resulting system is equivalent to
that of primitive recursive functions.
The next step is to consider the category of decidable predicates in Σ0, denoted Pred(Σ0). The final
step adjoins quotients to obtain Pred(Σ0)ex/reg. It will be a theorem that this coincides with the initial
arithmetic universe U0. The initiality of U0 is key, for it implies that U0 is the syntactic category Syn(TAU ),
where TAU is a weak variant on Martin-Lof type theory.
1The expert reader will have noticed the similarity between the second and third of these axioms and the Giraud axioms of
topos theory.
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2 Arithmetic Universes
In this section we cover some of the basics surrounding arithmetic universes.
Definition 2.1. Let A,B be two objects in a category C with coproducts and pullbacks. We may form the
coproduct A+B. The category C is said to have disjoint coproducts if the pullback
A×A+B B B
A A+B
is isomorphic to the initial object 0 [coproduct over the empty diagram].
Definition 2.2. Let C be a category equipped with a terminal object. A natural numbers object is an object
N equipped with a map 0 : 1→ N and a map S : N→ N such that for every a : 1→ X and g : X → X
there is a unique map f : N→ X such that the following diagram commutes:
1 N N
X X
0
a
S
f f
g
Definition 2.3. Let C be a category with finite products. A parametrized natural numbers object is an object
N equipped with a map 0 : 1→ N and a map S : N→ N such that for every a : A→ X and g : X → X
there is a unique map f : A× N→ X such that the following diagram commutes:
A A× N A× N
X X
0
a
Id×S
f f
g
Definition 2.4. A category C equipped with finite limits has parameterized list objects if for any object
A ∈ ObC there is an object List(A) with morphisms c : 1→ List(A) and appA : List(A)×A→ List(A)
such that for every b : B → Y and g : Y ×A→ A there is a unique rec(b, g) making the following diagram
commute
B B × List(A) B × (List(A)×A)
Y Y ×A
b
(idB ,c)
rec(b,g)
idB×appA
rec(b,g)×idA
g
Remark 2.5. The need for parameterized natural number objects and parameterized list objects is because
as we will see arithmetic universe will not be Cartesian closed. In this setting the non-parameterized
versions are not well-behaved.
Definition 2.6. Let C be a category with finite limits. An internal equivalence relation onX is a subobject
R ↪→ X ×X equipped with the following morphisms:
• (Reflexivity) r : X → R which is a section of p1 : X ×X → X and of p2 : X ×X → X .
• (Symmetry) s : R→ R such that p1 ◦ s = p2 and P2 ◦ s = p1.
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• (Transitivity) t : R×X R→ R where if
R×X R R
R X
q2
q1 p1
p2
is the pullback square the equations p1 = pi1 ◦ i, p2 = pi2 ◦ i, p1 ◦ q1 = p1 ◦ t and p2 ◦ q2 = p2 ◦ t. Here
R X ×X Xi pi1
pi2
Definition 2.7. The coequalizerX/R := coeq(i1, i2) of an internal relationR ↪→ X×X is called a quotient
object:
R X X/Ri1
i2
A quotient X → X/R is called effective when it arises as a kernel pair, i.e. the monomorphism
X ×X/R X → X
Definition 2.8. Let C be a category with finite limits. Let P be a (categorical) property of an object or
diagram of objects I in C. We say P is stable if when P holds for I it also holds for the pullback f∗(I) in
C/A for any f : A→ 1.
Definition 2.9. A pretopos is a category equipped with finite limits, stable finite disjoint coproducts and
stable effective quotients of monic equivalence relations. An arithmetic universe is a pretopos which has
parametrized list objects.
The theory of arithmetic universes is highly reminiscent of that of topoi. Yet arithmetic universes are
quite different from topoi in a number of ways.
Remark 2.10 (Small versus large). Typically, almost every topos one deals with is large. In contrast in
AU-theory there are many interesting small AU’s. This has the distinct advantage that we may describe
internal AU’s simply as certain internal categories, unlike the case of (Grothendieck) topoi where one has
to resort to indexed categories.
Small indexed categories and internal categories are almost equivalent, except that internal categories
are more strict, various equations holding up to equality instead of isomorphism. Strictness is often
important in obtaining interpretations for various (type-theoretic) languages. Explicit manipulation of
internal categories will be key in the proof of Gódel’s incompleteness theorem.
Remark 2.11 (Recursive versus arbitrary infinities). An important topic in topos theory is that of
geometric logic and geometric theories. A distinct feature is the ability to consider infinitary theories over
a topos E , where axioms can be build as ∨i∈IAi-operator of atomic sentence Ai over infinite collections I .
These infinities arise from the base topos E , in the sense that I may be any object of E . In the arithmetic
approach, one cannot index over ’any’ infinite set. Instead, one has to give an explicit recursive description
of these sets. This phenomenon was the central impetus for investigating ’arithmetic reasoning’ [where
infinities must be recursively described] instead of ’geometric reasoning’ [where the infinities may come
from the base], see [Hazratpour and Vickers, 2018] and [Vickers, 2017] based principally on Vicker’s
geometrization programme already outlined in the last section of [Vickers, 1999].
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Remark 2.12 (Predicative versus impredicative reasoning). A third difference between topos theory
and AU-theory is that of predicativity. Traditionally a topos is assumed to be locally cartesian closed,
equipped with power objects and dependent products. Power sets have been regarded with suspicion,
going back all the way back to Russel and Poincare, for they allow for ’impredicative reasoning’, a fairly
imprecise term referring to definitions of objects X that already implicitly assume the existence of said
object X . A famous instance of how impredicative reasoning can be treacherous is Berry’s paradox: ’the
smallest positive integer not nameable in under 60 letters’. There are only finitely many strings under 60
letters, but there are infinitely many numbers. Hence there must be a least number not nameable in 60
letters. But we have just named it!
Russel argued that the paradoxical nature of Berry’s non-nameable number is caused by a form of vicious
circularity. What goes wrong, he claimed, is that an entity is defined, or a proposition is formulated,
in a way that is dangerously circular. 2 Nowadays, issues of predicativity have been mostly forgotten
and even constructive mathematicians use power sets with gay abandon. Yet at the start of the 20th
century the issue of impredicative reasoning attracted the attention of big-name mathematicians, the first
predicative foundations going back to Weyl.
The arithmetic reasoning that is legitimate in AU’s is natively predicative. The first important instance
where predicative and impredicative foundations diverge occurs in the definition of topological space.
Traditionally a topological space is a set together with a collection of subsets, ostensibly relying funda-
mentally on the power set axiom of ZFC. In predicative foundations we need to change the definition of
topological space; instead of regarding open sets as fundamental we regard a generating basis of open
sets as the fundamental and axiomatises these, this leads to the notion of [various forms of] formal spaces.
Let us consider a concrete example where this change of definition will change the way we think about
’spaces’. The closure cl(T ) of a subset of T of a topological space X can be traditionally defined as the
intersection
⋂
T⊂C C of all closed sets containing T . This is problematic predicatively as we quantify over
a set {T ⊂ C} to define cl(T ) that itself includes cl(T ). In formal topology [which crop up when one
considers the analogy of subtoposes for Arithmetic Universes] the notion of closure splits and closed sets
split in the sense that there are multiple notions that are inequivalent predicatively, yet equivalent when
one allows for impredicative notions like unrestricted power sets.
2Not all mathematicians conclude from Berry’s paradox the unreliability of impredicative reasoning. A more conventional
view isolates the vagueness in the notion of ’definability’ or ’nameability’ as the culprit.
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3 Primitive Recursive Arithmetic and the Initial Arithmetic Universe
Definition 3.1. A Skolem category C is a category with finite products equipped with a natural number
object. A Skolem theory Σ is a Skolem category where every object is a finite product of the natural number
object NΣ. A morphism of Skolem Theories is a functor which preserves finite products and the Natural
Number object.
A Skolem theory is a kind of Lawvere theory where the operations arise from zero, successor and
recursion.
Example 3.2. The category of Skolem Theories has an intial object Σ0 which might be called the minimal
Skolem theory, or the "free theory" generated by the basic data.
Caveat. One cannot identify the arrows ofΣ0 with actual functions; for letΣstandard be the full subcategory
of Setwith objects 1,N,N2, · · · etc. Since Σ0 is initial we have a map of Skolem Theories:
Σ0 → Σstandard
(f : Nk → Nr) 7→ (|f | : Nk → Nr)
the idea is that f exists as a primitive recursive algorithm for the ’actual’ set-theoretic function |f |, and it
can happen that |f | = |g| but f 6= g. This might sound a little mysterious if one thinks in terms of the
set-theoretic conception of functions, which identifies functions with their graph. We want to work in a
setting where functions are more akin to algorithms; it may happen that functions coincide extensionally
but not intensionally.
Extensional equality of functions |f | = |g| means simply that f(x) = g(x) for all x in the domain, but
functions might have algorithmic differences which prevent the f from being equal to g. Intensional
character of a function is the additional features of a function, such as its algorithmic character, that go
beyond the extension (or graph) |f | of the function f . Another way of seeing this is that two functions
f, g might be given by different algorithms and even if in Set theory we may prove f(x) = g(x) for all x
in the domain, there might not be any primitive recursive construction that witnesses this!
Example 3.3. Let a : Σ0 → ΣStandard be the canonical map. Consider the category obtained by inverting
all maps f : X → Y ∈ Σ0 for which a(f) is a bĳection in ΣStandard. By a theorem of Kleene this is the
Skolem theory of total recursive functions.
A procedure will now be described which completes any Skolem Theory to a category with finite
limits. Let Σ be a Skolem theory. The idea is to adjoin "decidable subsets": define a subset of Nk to be
a map x : Nk → N such that x ∧ 1 = x. Write Pdec(Nk) for this class of subsets, Then Pdec is actually a
contravariant functor:
(Nk f−→ Nr) induces Pdec(Nr) f
∗
−→ Pdec(Nk)
The diagonal ∆ ∈ Pdec(N) is given by E : N2 → N defined above; similarly one defines a diagonal
∆k ∈ Pdec(N2k), for all k. The class of subsets Pdec(Nk) actually carries a Boolean algebra structure:
unions, intersections and complements of subsets correspond to the supremum, infinum and 1 minus
the corresponding characteristic functions.
Definition 3.4. Given a Skolem theory Σ the category Pred(Σ) of predicates in Σ is defined as follows:
• Ob(Pred(Σ)) : Decidable predicates in Σ, that is morphisms P : N→ N such that P ∗ P = P .
• Mor(Pred(Σ)): Σ-morphisms f : N→ N such that P ≤ Q ◦ f [where Q ◦ f is the composition of Q
with f ] and two such Σ-morphisms f, g : N→ N are equal if P ∗ f = P ∗ g
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Proposition 3.5. Here are some properties of Σ→ Pred(Σ):
1. Pred(Σ) has finite limits: for example the equalizer of f, g : Nk ⇒ Nr is just the subset S ∈ Pdec(Nk)
given by Nk (f,g)−−−→ Nr × Nr E−→ N.
2. Pred(Σ) is regular and satisfies the axiom of choice. In fact, any arrow factors as a split epi followed by a
mono ( caution: do not confuse monomorphisms with subsets!). Suppose we are given f : N→ N: we may
factor f as N im(f) ↪→ N. Define im(f) = {< f(n),m >∈ N× N|m = µ(k ≤ n ∈ f−1(n))}, which
is has the splitting of N  im(f) given by (f(n),m >7→ m. Here the µ operator is primitive recursively
defined as bounded minimization: it looks for the minimum k ∈ f−1(n) over all natural numbers smaller
than n which is indeed primitive recursive [unbounded minimisation is of course not primitive recursive].
3. Coproducts exist in Pred(Σ): given decidable subsets S, T ofN, for example, take the union of the decidable
subsets S × {0} and T × {1} of N2.
4. for any graph object
G→ A0
in Σ, there exists a free category object A1 ⇒ A0 over G in Σˆ
Proof. See Proposition 4.7 of [Maietti, 2010].
Example 3.6. The category Pred(Σ0) is the category of decidable primitive recursive predicates.
For our purposes Pred(Σ) does not have enough categorical properties. It is necessary to make a
second completion Σ→ Pred(Σ)→ (Pred(Σ))ex/reg which adds quotients.
Definition 3.7 (Exact/Regular completion). Let C be a regular category. We form a new category whose
objects are pairs (R,A) with R ↪→ A×A an equivalence relation on A, and whose maps (R,A)→ (R,B)
are classes of maps f : A→ B such that R ≤ (f × f)−1(Q), under the relation f ∼ g if and only if there
exists a lifting of (f, g):
Q
A B ×B
The resulting category is an exact category.
Proposition 3.8. The category (Pred(Σ0))ex/reg is an arithmetic universe. In particular the following properties
hold:
• finite limits exists
• it is a regular category [but notice that the step Pred(Σ)→ (Pred(Σ))ex/reg spoils the splitting of the image
factorisation]
• coproducts exists.
• free category objects exist for any graph object
• quotients exists (but are not split in general)
Proof. See proposition 4.10 of [Maietti, 2010].
These axioms are the defining properties for the notion for Arithmetic Universe (AU). Applying the
completion procedure for Pred(Σ0) yields the initial Arithmetic Universe U0.
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Theorem 3.9. The category (Pred(Σ))ex/reg coincides with the initial arithmetic universe.
Proof. See Theorem 6.2 of [Maietti, 2010].
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4 Arithmetic Type Theory
We will see that there is a very precise correspondence between the initial arithmetic universe U0 and the
arithmetic type theory calculus TAU . This typed calculus can be thought of as a type-theoretic incarnation
of primitive recursive arithmetic. Indeed, any primitive recursive function can be encoded in this type
theory. There is also a related but different correspondence between register machines and Skolem
theories, cf [Morrison, 1996]. Using register machines one can also encode primitive recursive functions.
In this chapter we will introduce arithmetic type theory and detail how it corresponds to the internal
language of arithmetic universes.
Remark 4.1. Type theory might not be familiar to most mathematicians brought up in the set-theoretic
tradition. Type theory is an alternative foundation for mathematics, whose basic objects are not
elements and sets as in traditional set-theory but terms and types. Proponents claim it to have
several distinct advantages over the traditional set-theory based formulation of mathematics. For
one, Type Theory is natively constructive. It also integrates the logic and the rest of the foundational
system more tightly than in the traditional set-up, where ZFC is build on top of a specified logical
syntax. Interest in type theory has surged with the recent development of Homotopy Type Theory, see
[Univalent Foundations Program, 2013]. We will be mostly concerned with a specific type theory called
Arithmetic Type theory TAU .
Remark 4.2. Objects of study of type theory, i.e. types, have different ontological status than objects of
study of set theory, i.e. sets. Types are constructed together with their elements, and not by collecting
some previously existing elements unlike the case of sets. “A type is defined by prescribing what we
have to do in order to construct an object of that type.” [Martin-Lof, 1998]. The fundamental principle of
type theory is that types should be defined by introduction, elimination, and computation rules. This is
closely related to the well-known principle of category theory: objects should be defined by universal
properties.
To make this point clear we give the example of binary product as a universal construction in category
theory. The following table illustrates the connection between categorical products and type theoretic
products:
Type theory Category theory
z : A×B
fst z : A, snd z : B
A
pi1←− A×B pi2−→ B
a : A, b : B
〈a, b〉 : A×B
X A×B
A
B
pi1
pi2
a
b
〈a, b〉
fst〈a, b〉 = a pi1〈a, b〉 = a
snd〈a, b〉 = a pi2〈a, b〉 = b
〈snd z, fst z〉 = z uniqueness (in the UP)
Type theory is an alternative to the traditional set-theoretic foundations. Recently, a variant called
Homotopy type theory has attracted a great amount of interest [[Univalent Foundations Program, 2013]].
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Formerly the beau of a small cadre of logicians, computer scientists and heterodox mathematicians type
theory has blossomed with the advent of the Univalent Foundations Program/ Homotopy Type Theory
and commands ever larger throngs of adherents. We will be primarily interested in a non-homotopic
variant which we’ll christen Arithmetic Type Theory for convenience.
Remark 4.3. Type theory is natively constructive, meaning in particular that the Principle of Excluded
Middle does not hold in general. It is commonly supposed that constructive mathematics imposes too
heavy a constraint on the tools a mathematician may use.
For many it comes as a surprise to learn that constructive mathematics is more general than classical
mathematics. Classical mathematical systems may in fact be embedded inside their constructive
counterparts. Some favoured theorems will not hold as stated, but experience suggests that by changing
the definitions slightly the spirit if not the letter of the law may be preserved. Rather than a annoying
inconvenience searching for the alternative formulations often turns up newmathematics in well-trodden
fields. For a very clear exposition of the advantages of constructive mathematics and the relation with the
internal language of topoi [of which arithmetic universes are a generalisation] see the first two chapters
of [Blechschmidt, 2017].
In traditional foundations one learns that everything is a set. Set theory starts as a theory with one
binary connective ∈ and then proceeds by postulating a number of axioms with the hope of explaining
all the possible behavior a set must have. Type theory starts from an entirely different perspective. It
involves several kinds of declarations, called judgments, which declare that something is a type or term of
a type. These judgments are derived from rules which explain how new judgments can be made from
old ones. As an example, suppose that we interested in the disjoint sum. Assuming that the type theory
has the disjoint sum type, then the disjoint sum comes with the following rules:
• If A and B are types, then A+B is a type.
• If a : A is a term of type A, then ι1(a) : A+B is a term of type A+B. Similarly, if b : B is a term of
type B, then ι2(b) : A+B is a term of type A+B.
Actually, more rules are needed which explain how the terms of a disjoint sum are used, see below. It is
hoped that the general syntax is nevertheless elucidated.
The type theory we need is a type theory constructed by Maietti [Maietti, 2005] in the style of
Martin-Löf [Martin-Löf and Sambin, 1984]. One of the features of this kind of type theory is that the
identity can be considered as a type. This gives us two different kinds of ways to talk about identities in
the type theory. There are identities which are postulated by valid judgments a = a′ : A that say that
the terms a and a′ are judged equal. So for the above example, we would need a rule that says that if
a = a′ : A is a valid judgment, then ι1(a) = ι1(a′) : A+B is a valid judgment. This kind of equality is
understandably called judgmental equality. But then there are propositional equalities: if A is a type and
a : A and a′ : A are terms of that type then there is a type a =A a′. The idea is that if this type has a term,
then the equality must be equal. So terms should be thought of as proofs, hence the name propositional
equality. The rules of this equality work (approximately, the more formal definition follows later) as
follows:
• If a = a′ : A is a valid judgment, then there is a term (proof) ∗ : a =A a′.
• If t : a =A a′ is a term of the type, then t = ∗ : (a =A a′). ’All proofs are equal’.
• If t : a =A a′ is a term of the type, then a = a′ : A is a judgmental equality.
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Remark 4.4. The last two rules makes our type theory an extensional type theory. An intentional type theory
is one where one does not try to collapse the different inhabitans of the identity type. The distinction was
first made by Martin-Löf, who published his intentional type theory in 1975 [Martin-Löf, 1975] and his
extensional one in 1984 [Martin-Löf and Sambin, 1984]. The intentional type theory has the advantage
that propositional equality is decidable. In extensional type theory the propositional equality is not
decidable, but at first sight it seems more suitable for ordinary mathematics. However, it has been argued
at length [Hofmann, 1995] that intentional type theory with extensional features is actually the right
way to do type theory. Homotopy type theory is based on Martin-Löf’s intentional type theory, adding
the univalence axiom, which says roughly that isomorphic structures may be identified. The main idea
of homotopy type theory is that a type should not be seen as a type, but as a space (in the sense of
homotopy theory). Homotopy type theory provides a new foundation of mathematics called univalent
foundations. This not only provides an easier way to build a proof-checkers of ordinary mathematics, it
also provides a way to do interesting mathematics which has not come up under classical set theory:
synthetic homotopy theory. See the Homotopy type theory book [Univalent Foundations Program, 2013]
for more information.
Maietti’s type theory is an extensional type theory based on the extensional version of Martin-Löf’s
type theory [Martin-Löf and Sambin, 1984].
Type theory reasons about declarations called judgments. There are the judgments that say a particular
structure is a context, type or term.
• Γ is a context (formally ‘Γ cont’).
• A is a type in context Γ (formally ‘x : Γ ` A(x) Type).
• a : A is a term in context Γ (formally x : Γ ` a : A(x)).
Then there are also the judgments which declare certain contexts, types or terms to be equal:
• Γ and Γ′ are equal as contexts (formally ‘Γ = Γ′ cont’).
• A and B are equal types in context Γ (formally x : Γ ` A = B).
• a : A and a′ : A are equal terms in context Γ (formally Γ ` a = a′ : A).
These judgments are derived by certain rules allowing one to make a new valid judgment τ from a list of
valid judgments σ1, . . . , σn. Usually in type theory, this is written down in a strictly formalized way as
σ1 . . . σn
τ
We are going to be a bit more informal; we think that it is less daunting for an ordinary mathematician to
see the statement ‘if σ1, . . . , σn are valid judgments, then τ is a valid judgment’. For the more formal
description of Maietti’s type theory see [Maietti, 2005].
The first rules we take care of are the context rules. A context is a list of variables in types
x1 ∈ A1, . . . , xn : An where each type may depend on the previous one, so the contexts are generated by
the rules
• The empty list ∅ is a context.
• If Γ is a context and Γ ` A(x) Type a type dependent on Γ, then Γ, x : A is a context, where x is
required to be a new variable not in Γ.
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There are more structural rules. A variable in a context can be declared a term:
• If Γ, x : A,∆ is a context, then Γ, x : A,∆ ` x : A is a term in context.
There are some coherence rules for equality:
• If Γ ` A = B are equal types and Γ ` a : A is a term of A in context Γ, then Γ ` a : B is a term of
type B in context Γ.
• If Γ ` a = a′ : A are equal terms of type A, and Γ ` A = B type are equal types, then a = a′ : B are
equal terms of type B.
There are some ordinary equality rules as well that say that equality behaves as an equivalence relation.
We only write down these rules for types:
• If Γ ` A Type is a type in context, then A is equal to itself: Γ ` A = A.
• If Γ ` A = B is an equality of types, then Γ ` B = A is an equality of types as well.
• If Γ ` A = B and Γ ` B = C are equalities of types, then so is Γ ` A = C.
These rules must of course also hold for the equalities of contexts and terms.
The following two rules are derivable by induction, but they are nevertheless important. The
substitution rules are
• If Γ ` a : A and Γ, x : A,∆ ` b(x) : B(x) are terms, then Γ,∆[a/x] ` b(a) : B(a), where ∆[a/x] is ∆
with all mentions of x replaced by a.
• If Γ ` a : A and Γ, x : A,∆ ` b(x) = b′(x) : B(x) then Γ,∆ ` b(a) = b′(a) : B(a).
The rules of weakening are
• If Γ ` A Type is a type and Γ,∆ ` b : B a term, then Γ,∆ ` b : B is a term.
• If Γ ` A Type is a type and Γ,∆ ` b = b′ : B an equality of terms, then Γ, x : A,∆ ` b = b′ : B is an
equality of terms.
Type constructors
The remaining kind of rules that need to be discussed are the rules that belong to type constructors -
a type constructor specifies how to build a new type from existing ones and how to use it. Each type
constructor comes with five kind of rules:
1. Formation rules that say when the type constructor yields a new type.
2. Introduction rules that say how to define new terms of the newly constructed type.
3. Elimination rules that say how terms of the type are used.
4. Computation rules that say how the elimination and introduction rules are combined.
5. Uniqueness rules that say how the terms of the type are uniquely determined by the elimination
rules. They are often omitted, for they are usually derivable.
Then each time a new type or term is introduced there need to be new rules that state that the equality is
well-behaved. For instance, when the disjoint sum type constructor and its terms are defined there are
additional equality rules
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• If Γ ` A = A′ and Γ ` B = B′ are type equalities, then there is the type equality Γ ` A+B = A′+B′.
• If Γ ` a = a′ : A are equal terms, then Γ ` ι1(a) = ι1(a′) : A+B are also equal terms.
These usually remain unstated, for no other reason than to save space. The rules for the term and type
constructors are given by Maietti as follows
14
Figure 1: Reproduced from [Maietti, 2003]
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The basic type theory for arithmetic universes Au is the dependent type theory that consists of all the
above type constructors. It is possible to extend the basic type theory Au to something larger.
Definition 4.5. A theory ofAu is a typed calculus T that consists of the type constructors ofAu containing
possible additional type judgments Γ ` A Type, term judgments Γ ` a : A, type equality judgments
Γ ` A = B and term equality judgments Γ ` a =A a′. There are some obvious restrictions: Γ ` a : A can
only be added if Γ ` A Type is derivable in T , Γ ` A = B if Γ ` A Type and Γ ` B Type are derivable in
T , and Γ ` a =A a′ if Γ ` a : A and Γ ` a′ : A are derivable in T . A morphism of theories T → T ′ is an
assignment of judgements of T to the judgements of T ′ which preserve the rules.
Remark 4.6. The internal language of an arithmetic universe has been mentioned, but what does this
mean exactly? Roughly, it means the following: given an arithmetic universe U we may interpret types in
TAU as objects in U and types in context in its slice categories U/c (where c is the context). Operations
like sum and product of types in the type theory correspond to sum and product in the category U . An
operation like the existence operator ∃ is a little more involved, using the image factorisation that an
arithmetic universe possesses by virtue of it being a ’regular’ category.
Example 4.7. Let C be any category. Let TC be the theory which is obtained by adding to the calculus
of Au one closed type (i.e. in which the context is empty) ` A Type for every object A of C, a term
x : A ` f(x) : B for every morphism f : A→ B in C, a type equality A = B type if A and B are the same
objects in C and a term equality x : A ` f(x) = g(x) : B if f and g are the same morphisms in C.
Remark 4.8. One should be careful to distinguish Type Theory in general, and specific type theories. In
that vein, be aware that there is a difference between TAU and TU . Both are often called the ’internal
language’. Roughly, the latter regards the arithmetic universe U as a distinct mathematical universe
in which one may do mathematics, while the former concerns constructions that makes sense for any
Arithmetic Universe. On the other hand they are related: TU is build from TAU by adding certain
types, terms, and equalities — but no new rules! In short, TU concerns mathematics internal to a given
mathematical universe U while TAU is the language that is used between different mathematical universes.
Definition 4.9. Let T be a theory in the above sense. The syntactic category of T is a category CT with as
objects the closed types ` A Type of T . If ` A Type and ` B Type are two closed types, then a morphism
from ` A Type to ` B Type is defined as a term x : A ` f(x) : B, where two morphisms x : A ` f(x) : B
and x : A ` g(x) : B are considered to be equal if x : A ` f(x) = g(x) : B is derivable. Composition is
given by substitution and the identity is represented by x : A ` x : A.
Let T be a theory of Au. Then CT is an arithmetic universe.
Remark 4.10 (Syntax-Semantics adjunction). We will focus on the initial object Uin of the category of
Arithmetic Universes AU . Initiality of the model will mean roughly that TAU = TUin ; one also says
that Uin is the syntactic category for the type theory TAU . Let AU denote the category of arithmetic
universes, and morphisms preserving all structure, let TAU − Type denote type theories over TAU with
maps interpretations preserving structure up to isomorphism — we will explain this in more detail later.
We have an ’syntax-semantics’ adjunction
TAU − Type AU
Syn
Lan
a
where the Lan-functor produces the internal language TU of an arithmetic universe U and the Syn-
functor the syntactic category CT for a given TAU -type theory T . In this case, the adjunction is in fact an
equivalence.
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Given a theory T we may construct its syntactic category Syn(T ). In our case we will take T = TAU .
This type theory can encode primitive recursive arithmetic.
Theorem 4.11. The syntactic category coincides with Joyal’s construction: Syn(TAU ) ∼= U0 := Pred(Σ0)ex/reg.
Proof. Theorem 6.6 of [Maietti, 2003].
Given a sentence φ in the language of T we may ask whether T proves φ. The sentence φ also appears
as a subobject of 1 in Syn(T ). Its provability is exactly the assertion that it is the maximal subobject of 1.
This motivates the following definition.
Definition 4.12. An arithmetic universe U is consistent if 0 ∈ P1 and 1 ∈ P1 are distinct. A theory U is
complete if given u ∈ P1, we have u = 0 or u = 1 [in the meta-theory].
Remark 4.13. A peculiarity of the above definition is that syntactic completeness is a sort of Boolean
property of the syntactic category Syn(T ). Indeed, this is already apparent in the classical formulation
of syntactic completeness as the existence of a proof φ or its negation ¬φ for all sentences φ in the theory.
The above formulation brings intuitionistic aspects of the provability predicate in direct contact with the
constructive nature of the internal languages of categories.
Remark 4.14. There are traditionally two notions of both completeness and consistency, a semantic one
and a syntactic one. A theory T is semantically consistent 3 if it has a modelM . A theory is semantically
complete4 if for any formula φ in the language of T it is provable if and only if it is true in all models.
A theory T is syntactically consistent if it does not prove a contradiction, i.e. if it does not derive the
falsum ⊥. A theory is syntactically complete if for any φ either T proves φ or it proves its negation ¬φ.
The semantic side and the syntactic side are often conflated, but it is important to keep them distinct.
The semantic side always refers to a class of models S = {Mi}i∈I for the theory T , while the syntactic
theory only refers to the theory. The Godel Completeness theorem states that classical first order theories
are semantically complete with respect to Set-models. Logics that are not classical first-order often fails
to have enough Set-based models. In categorical logic one works instead with category-based models.
Despite being of indisputable interest, semantic notions of completeness and consistency will not occupy
us here.
The first Gödel Incompleteness Theorem states that a recursively enumerable theory T that is
consistent and can encode arithmetic is syntactically incomplete. The Second Incompleteness Theorem
states if a recursively enumerable theory T that can encode a weak fragment of arithmetic proves its own
consistency then in fact it is not consistent.
3This is sometimes also called satisfiability of T .
4This is sometimes called validity of T .
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5 The Gödel Incompleteness Theorems
In this section we will give a proof of Gödel’s second Incompleteness Theorem using arithmetic universes.
Definition 5.1. Let P be an object of a category C. We say P is projective if given any epimorphism S  T
we have a lift
S
P T
At this point a translation of Cantor’s Diagonal argument into categorical terms is given for motivation
and later comparison.
Theorem 5.2 (Cantor). Let E a topos in which 1 is projective. If there exists an enumeration f : A PA , then
E is degenerate.
Proof. Indeed, suppose f exists, form the pullback
D 1
A A×A A× PA P1
y
false
∆A 1A×f eval
and consider nameD : 1→ PA. By definition of projectivity of 1 there is a lifting a of pDq
A
1 PA
a
nameD
then Ja ∈ DK is defined by the pullback
Ja ∈ DK D
1 A
y
a
the composite pullback
Ja ∈ DK D 1
1 A A×A A× P P1
y y
false
a ∆A 1A×f eval
is then just Ja ∈ DK 1
1 P1.
y
false
pJa∈DKq
It follows that
Ja ∈ DK 1 P1p0qp1q
is an equalizer. Indeed, suppose
Z 1 P1!Z
p0q
p1q
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is a commutative diagram. Then we have, since SubE(Z) = homE(Z,P1) is a poset with p0q ◦ !Z as
bottom and p1q ◦ !Z as top, that p0q ◦ !Z ≤ Ja ∈ DK ≤ p1q ◦ !Z = p0q ◦ !Z . Thus Ja ∈ DK = p1q ◦ !Z =
p0q ◦ !Z . Then, by one of the two pullbacks above, !Z factors through Ja ∈ DK. It then follows that
(Ja ∈ DK ↪→ 1) ' (0 ↪→ 1).
Next, Ja ∈ DK is also the pullback of false along false, so (Ja ∈ DK ↪→ 1 ' (1 ↪→ 1) as well; but then
0 = 1 .
Definition 5.3. Let U be an arithmetic universe. An AU-object E is an internal category
E1 ×E0 E1 ◦−→ E1 ⇒ E0
such that internally E is a list-arithmetic pretopos. Arithmetic universe objects (AUO’s) and their internal
functors form a (large, external) category AUOU ; hence it makes sense to talk about limits, colimits,
initiality, et cetera of AU-objects.
Definition 5.4. A sketch is quadrupleK = (G,U,D,C) where G is a graph, U : G0 → G1 is a function,
D is a collection of diagrams in G and C is a collection of cones in G. A sketch morphism T : K → K ′ is
a graph homomorphism T : G→ G′ such that (i)T ◦ U = U ′ ◦ T , (ii) every diagram in D is mapped to a
diagram in D′ and (iii) every cone in C is mapped to a cone in C ′.
Definition 5.5. If C is a category then the underlying sketchKC = (G,U,D,C) is given as
• G is the underlying graph of C
• U is the map which picks out the identity arrows of C
• D is the collection of all commutative diagrams of C
• C is the collection of all limit cones of C.
Definition 5.6. A model for a sketch K in a category C is a morphisms of sketches from K to the
underlying sketchKC of C.
Note that the modelsMod(K, C) ofK in C form a category.
Lemma 5.7. There is a sketch KSkolem of Skolem categories.
Proof. See Lemma 7.12 in [Morrison, 1996].
Theorem 5.8. Let E be any arithmetic universe. Internally, we may construct the initial arithmetic universe object
U0(E).
This is Theorem 7.13 of [Morrison, 1996]. We give a sketch of the proof. The nontrivial part is the
construction of the internal initial Skolem theory Σ′0. This relies fundamentally on the fact that Arithmetic
Universes have parameterized list object and hence may implement primitive recursion. The reader is
warned that the second part of the proof is not terribly enlightening, but may nevertheless give a sense of
"what’s involved".
Proof. We consider the sketch KSkolem and the empty sketch K0. We have a morphism of sketches
K0 → KSkolemwhich induces the forgetful functorK : KSkolem(U0)→ K0(U0); by the free model theorem
[Theorem 29 of [Palmgren and Vickers, 2007]] there is a free left adjoint L : {•} = K0(U0)→ KSkolem(U0).
The internal initial Skolem theory is Σ′ := L(•).
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Let the following denote Σ′
Σ′1 Σ′0 Σ′1δ1
δ0
e Σ′1 ×Σ′0 Σ′1 Σ′1
m
We construct internally Pred(Σ′). The object of objects of Pred(Σ′) is all predicates, i.e. the following
equaliser
Σ′1 ×Σ′0 Σ′1
Pred(Σ′)0 Σ′1 Σ′1
m∆
id
The arrows from A to B in Pred(Σ′) are equivalence classes of the set
{f : NU0 → NU0 |A ≤ B ◦ f}
which is internally constructed as the equalizer
Σ′1 × Pred(Σ′0)
X Σ′1 × Pred(Σ′0)× Pred(Σ′0) Σ′0
≤(pi2,m◦(pi1,pi3))
True
Next, define
d0 : X ↪→ Σ′1 × Pred(Σ′0)× Pred(Σ′0) pi2−→ Pred(Σ′0)
d1 : X ↪→ Σ′1 × Pred(Σ′0)× Pred(Σ′0) pi3−→ Pred(Σ′0)
We have f ∼ g if and only if A ≤ eq(f, g). We construct the pullback of f, g such that f, g have the same
source and target as
Y X
X Pred(Σ′1)× Pred(Σ′1)
p1
p2
(d0,d1)
(d0,d1)
The subset R of Y with (f, g) ∈ R if and only if src(f) ≤ eq(f, g) is build as the equalizer:
Pred(Σ′0)× Y × Y Pred(Σ′0)× Σ′0
R Y Σ′0
(src◦p1,p1,p2)
True
The object of morphisms Pred(Σ′)1 is given as the quotient of R ↪→ Y . The exact-regular completion is a
similar mess.
Remark 5.9. It has become clear that, although quotidian, the need for redoing external constructions
internally is a burdensome process. Ideally, one would have access to a device that could make these
internal workings completely routine. The internal language provides such a device.
Definition 5.10. Given an internal category C inside a category D with finite limits we may take the
externalisation, taking objectwise global sections: Ext(C) = (HomD(1, Ob(C)), HomD(1,Mor(C))) with
the obvious maps. We obtain an external category Ext(C).
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Remark 5.11. There is a different kind of externalization that is more common. That is the Grothendieck-
externalization
∫
Cwhose objects are X : I → Ob(C) and morphisms are diagrams
Mor(C)
I Ob(C)
<cod,dom>f
<X,Y >
It is well-known that this gives a 2-functor
∫
: C(U0)→ Fib/U0 from the 2-category of internal categories
to fibrations over U0. This functor is in fact fullly faithful, see lemma 2.3.3 of B3 in [Johnstone, 2003]. This
2-functor sends internal (co)limits to fibered (co)limits. The simple externalization Ext(•) is simply the
fiber over the terminal object, in other words Ext(C) =
∫
C. That means that if C has a certain limit or
colimit Ext(C) has that (co)limit, and it is moreover stable under pullback.
Remark 5.12. There is an important difference between local existence or global existence. Take for
example the statement that an internal category C has an internal terminal object. Local existence would
say that in the Kripke-Joyal semanticsC |= ∃ 1 : C such that 1 is a terminal objectwhich is different from the
statement that there exists an object 1C : 1U0 → C such that C |= 1C is a terminal object. In the construction
we actually get global existence for the objects that we construct and this is key.
Proposition 5.13. Let E be an arithmetic universe equipped with an internal arithmetic universe object U. The
externalisation Ext(U) of an internal arithmetic universe object U is an (external) arithmetic universe.
Proof. An arithmetic universe is a list-arithmetic pretopos. That means that U0 is internal category that is
internally
• Finitely complete
By the above remarks on the Grothendieck-externalization
∫
this is immediate.
• Finite disjoint stable coproducts
Similarly. In fact, we have all finite colimits.
• Parameterized list objects
We have internal list objects in U0. As we have global existence of our objects this means that
for any object A : 1 → Ob(U0) there is a diagram (1 cons−−−→ A app←−− A × L(A)) : U0(1) such that
U0 |= pFor all 1 c−→ Y f←− Y ×A ∃!rec(f, g) : L(A)→ Y such that the natural diagrams commuteq. Let’s
write that out using the Kripke-Joyal semantics. The above maybe be translated as
for all g1 : I1 → 1 (B c−→ Y f←− Y × g∗1A) : U0(I1) there exists p2 : I2  I1
and a unique (rec(c, f) : p∗2 → p∗2p∗1L(A)) : U0 such that
I2 |=
p∗2g∗11 p∗2g∗1L(A) p∗2g∗1L(A)× p∗2g∗1A
p2∗Y p∗2Y × p∗2g∗1A
rec(c,f) rec(c,f)
We may specialise to I1 = 1. Then we have
I2 Mor(U0)
1 Ob(U0)×Ob(U0)
rec(f,c)
p∗2Y×p∗2L(A)
By uniqueness of rec(c, f) it descends to 1 by effectiveness of quotients in an AU. So we see that
internal list objects give us external parameterized list objects!
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• Regular
which is equivalently the statement that U0 is (i) finitely complete (ii) has coequalizers by kernel
pairs and (iii) coequalizers by kernel pairs are preserved by pullback. The last condition does not
involve any existential quantifiers hence specializing to I1 = 1 yields the regularity of
∫
U0(1).
• Exactness
This means that for any given equivalence relation R ↪→ A×Awe have
U0 |= pR is a kernel pairq
i.e. if A/R denotes the coequalizer of A×A A
p1
p2 then we claim that U0 |= pR = A×A/R Aq
which is a simple equality, containing no existence quantifiers hence by the Kripke-Joyal semantics
it follows that Ext(U0) is exact.
Let U0 be the initial arithmetic universe, and U′0 its internal initial arithmetic universe. Let N denote
the natural number object in U0 and N′ the natural number object in U′0. Construct the externalization
U ′0 := ExtU0(U′0). Since U0 is the initial arithmetic universe there is the initial functor R : U0 → Ext(U′0).
Roughly speaking it interprets any construction that can be done in a general arithmetic universe in the
specific universe Ext(U′0), which why we’ll often denote R(A) = A′ for A ∈ U0.
We also have a global section functor Γ : Ext(U0)′ → U0. Let us see how it acts. On objects: we
construct the generic family of objects as a pullback
C1(1, •) C1
C0 C0 × C0
p <cod,dom>
<1,Id>
Given a representing code/name/arrowX : 1→ C0 for an object in U ′0 we compute Γ(X) as the pullback
Γ(X) C1(1′, •)
1 C0
p
where p : C1(1′, •)→ C0 denotes the projection to the codomain.
On arrows: let T0 be the pullback
T0 C1(1′, •)
C1 C0
p
dom
let T1 be the pullback
T1 C1(1′, •)
C1 C0
r p
cod
The way we constructed T0 implies it is a subobject of C2 = C1 ×C0 C1 and the composition map
◦ : C2 → C1 restrict to a map T0 → C1(1, •) such that
T0 C1(1′, •)
C1 C0
◦
p
cod
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commutes. By the universal property of the pullback we obtain a map s : T0 → T1. The generic family is
given by
T0 T1
C1
s
True′
Given a code for an arrow 1 f−→ Cwith domain R = dom ◦ f and codomain S = cod ◦ f we pullback
f∗T0 T1
1
f∗(s)
where we notice that f∗(T0) = R, f∗(T1) = S, so we get a map Γ(f) : R→ S.
Caution 5.14. The functor Γ is not a morphism of arithmetic universes!
Lemma 5.15. Let ηA : A ∈ U0. We have a map A→ Γ(A′) = A.
Proof. This follows from the existence of the Freyd cover obtained from gluing along the global section
functor Γ and the initiality of U0. We consider the arithmetic universe U ′0 = Ext(U). There is a functor
Γ : Ext(U)→ U0. Construct the Artin-Wraith gluing or Freyd cover Gl(Γ) along Γ. Its objects are triple
(A,B, α : A→ Γ(B)) where A ∈ U0, B ∈ Ext(U). There is a projection map p : Gl(Γ)→ Ext(U) acting
as (A,B, α : A→ Γ(B)) 7→ B which is an AU functor. By initiality we have a map T : U0 → Gl(Γ). Again
by initiality the diagram
Ext(U)
Gl(Γ)]
U0
p
T
R
commutes. Hence T acts as A 7→ (A,R(A) = A′, ηA : A→ Γ(A′). The map ηA : A→ Γ(A′) furnishes our
required map.
Remark 5.16 (Ingo). Remark that this is quite curious as it would appear to say that: U0 |= A ⇒
A′is provable which seems false. Indeed the analogous statement
PA ` (φ→ (PA ` φ)
is absolutely false. Take φ = Con(PA), then we conclude that if PAwere consistent it would prove its
own consistency, hence would be inconsistent by Godel II. We are saved however by the observation that
Con(PA) is not a formula in arithmetic type theory, but a sequent (as it uses a negation). Therefor this
argument cannot be carried out internally.
The internal arithmetic universe U0 does not have power objects. However, the power object do
exist, one level higher, in U0. Let X : 1→ U0 be a (global) object of U0. We have U0(•, X). To construct
the power object of subobject P(X) we would first have to construct the monomorphism. The usual
definition of monomorphism cannot be expressed in arithmetic type theory unfortunately, as it uses
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a universal quantifier one too many times. Fortunately, there is an alternate characterization: a map
i : Y → X is a monomorphism if in the following diagram
Y ×X Y Y
Y X
p1
p2
we have p1 = p2. Hence the object of monomorphisms is constructed asMono(X) = Σf :U0(•,X)p1 = p2.
The subobjects may be similarly constructed by defining the relation SX onMono(X) given by f ∼S g =
Σf,g:Mono(X)Cod(f)→ Cod(g) and then taking the quotient.
Given a subobject 1 A−→ P1′ there are two natural subobjects in U0 associated to A: the equalizer
JA = True′K 1 P1′A
True′
and the global sections Γ(A) = U′0(1′, A). These notions coincide:
Proposition 5.17. Let 1 A−→ P(1′). The following subobjects are equal:
Γ(A) = U′0(1′, A) = JA = True′K
Proof. Let’s investigate the relation between Γ(A) and JA = True′K. Recall how Γ(A) is constructed: Let
K0 denote the pullback
K0 U1(1′, •)
Mono(•, 1′) U0cod
over P1′ we have the commutative triangle
K0 1
P1′
True′
pullback this triangle along 1 A−→ P1′ to obtain
Γ(A) K0
1 1
1 P1′
True′
A
where the front and back faces are pullback squares. We obtain a map Γ(A) → JA = True′K by the
universal property of the equalizer.
We have a map True′ : 1 → K0. Compose this with the arrow JA = True′K → 1 to obtain a mapJA = True′K→ K0. Together with the map JA = True′K→ 1 this produces a map JA = True′K→ Γ(A)
by the universal property of the pullback.
Proposition 5.18. 1. If 1 N
′−→ U ′0 is the formal natural numbers object, then there is an enumeration
e : N P ′N′
of "all formulae with one variable free."
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2. The terminal object 1 is projective.
Proof. Recall that the initial arithmetic universe U0 is constructed in three stages: take the initial Skolem
theory Σ0, take its category of predicates Pred(Σ0) and finally construct the ex/reg-completion.
The construction of Σ′0 i complicated but essentially the morphismsMor(Σ′0) are given by primitive
recursive functions. These are primitive recursively enumerable hence we have an epimorphism
NMor(Σ′0). Similarly, forMor(U ′0). Observe that we have a map Im : Mor(U ′0)→Mono(U ′0) which is
defined by sending f : A→ B to im(f) ↪→ B. Next, for aN′ apply the quotient mapMono(•,N′) P (N′).
Notice that after applying this quotient map it will be the identity on monomorphisms. We conclude that
we have the required epimorphism N P(N′).
Suppose we have an epimorphism f : (Y1, A1)→ (Y2, A2) for equivalence relations A1, A2 on objects
Y1, Y2 ∈ Pred(Σ0), and a map x : 1→ (Y2, A2). By construction of the exact/regular completion the map
x : 1→ (Y2, A2) lifts to a map x˜ : 1→ Y2  (Y2, A2). Take the pullback
(Y1, A1)×(Y2,A2) Y2 Y2
(Y1, A1) (Y2, A2)
where we used that epimorphisms are stable under pullback. The pullback (Y1, A1)×(Y2,A2) Y2 is also of
the form (Y3, A3) for some equivalence relation A3 on Y3 ∈ Pred(Σ0). Hence we have an epimorphism
Y3  (Y3, A3); composing with (Y1, A1) ×(Y2,A2) Y2  Y2 we get an epimorphism Y3  Y2 using that
an epimorphism in an exact/completion of a category C between objects in the image of C yields an
epimorphism in C. In Pred(Σ0) we know that every map factor through a split epimorphism followed
by a monomorphism. We conclude that the map Y3  Y2 splits hence by composition we obtain a map
1→ Y3 and hence a map 1→ (Y1, A1).
Finally, we construct
N 7→ (ι : N→ [1′,N′])
where ηN = ι is the map which assigns each natural number n its "formal expression" n′.
Theorem 5.19 (Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem). If an arithmetic universe object U in Urec is [syntacti-
cally] complete then it is the trivial AU -object [hence inconsistent].
Proof. Cantor’s Diagonal argument will now be imitated to prove Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem in a
special case. Form the pullback:
D 1
N N× N [1′,N′]× P ′N′ P ′1′
false′
∆N ι×e eval
Since 1 is projective in the initial AU form the lift n of D′:
N
1 P ′N′
en
D′
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then Jn ∈ DK D 1
1 N N× N [1′,N′]× P ′N′ P ′1′
false′
n ∆N ι×e eval
is given by pullback. The subobject Jn ∈ DK is the categorical incarnation of the Gödel sentence G;
asking whether this subobject factors through 1 is equivalent to asking whether G is provable.
Consider Jn ∈ DK′ : 1 ↪→ P ′1′ , it follows that this is a pullback square by composition
Jn ∈ DK 1
1 P ′1′
false′
The bottom map is the composition eval ◦ ι × e ◦ ∆N ◦ n; we claim this composition coincides withJn ∈ DK′. Indeed e ◦ n = D′ = R(D) by definition of n. By construction also ι(n) = R(n) = n′ hence the
composition is Jn′ ∈ D′K = Jn ∈ DK′.
If Jn ∈ DK equals 0 = False then Jn ∈ DK is the pullback of false′ along false′,hence we concludeJn ∈ DK equals 1 = True. This contradicts the consistency of U0. On the other hand, if Jn ∈ DK
equals 1 = True then Jn ∈ DK is the pullback of True′ along False′, hence we conclude Jn ∈ DK equals
0 = False, contradiction. We conclude that the Gödel sentence Jn ∈ DK is neither 0 or 1.
We are now ready to see the proof of Godel’s second incompleteness theorem for PRA. Let U0, U ′0 be
as before. The arithmetic universe U0 proves the consistency of U ′0 if JTrue′ = False′K ↪→ 1 equals the
minimal subobject 0 ↪→ 1.
Theorem 5.20 (Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem). Assume that U0 is consistent. Then the subobjectJTrue′ = False′K ↪→ 1 does not equal the minimal subobject 0 ↪→ 1 in U0.
Proof. We have the diagram Jn ∈ DK 1
1 P ′1′
false′Jn∈DK′
we also have Jn ∈ DK 1
1 P ′1′
true′Jn∈DK′
this follows from the canonical map Jn ∈ DK → Γ(Jn ∈ DK′) = JJn ∈ DK′ = True′K. In turn the above
implies that
Jn ∈ DK 1 P ′1′false′
true′
commutes. We will show that it is also an equalizer. Let
Z 1 P ′1′!Z
false′
true′
be a commutative diagram. The object P1 is an internal poset with least element false′ and largest
element true′. Therefore the externalization hom(Z,P ′1′) is also a poset with bottom false′◦ !Z and top
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true′◦ !Z . Also false′◦ !Z ≤ Jn ∈ DK′ ≤ true′◦ !Z = false′◦ !Z . Thus Jn ∈ DK′ = true′◦ !Z = false′◦ !Z .
By the above pullback !Z factors through Jn ∈ DK.
If Jn ∈ DK equals 0 = False then Jn ∈ DK is the pullback of false′ along false′,hence we concludeJn ∈ DK equals 1 = True. This contradicts the consistency of U0. It follows that Jn ∈ DK = JTrue′ =
False′K is not 0 and the consistency of U ′0 is not provable.
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6 Lob’s Theorem
This is a sketch of a proof of Lob’s theorem in Arithmetic Universes. For now, the reader can assume that
U = U0 is the initial arithmetic universe.
To give a proof of Lob’s theorem we will need to be able to state Lob’s Theorem.
Definition 6.1. We say that φ implies ψ in U , written U |= φ ` ψ, if there is an inclusion of subobjects
φ ↪→ ψ. We interpret φ as the judgement > ` φ.
Notice that as defined above, a judgement φ ` ψ is not itself a proposition. It is therefore not
immediately apparent how to interpret the (conceptually distinct) sentences like (φ → ψ) → χ or
φ→ (ψ → χ).
An arithmetic universe is typically not cartesian closed, so the usual way of talking about implication
will not work here. Let U be an arithmetic universe, let φ, ψ ↪→ 1 be monomorphisms/propositions. Let
U [φ→ ψ] = U [φ ≤ ψ] be the classifying AU of φ ≤ ψ. We have an adjoint pair of AU functors
U U [φ ≤ ψ]
i∗
i∗
a
Moreover, we also know U [> ≤ φ] = u[φ] = U/φ, we may then identify i∗ with the pullback along
i : φ ↪→ 1
Definition 6.2. Given two judgements φ ` ψ and σ ` τ we interpret implication of judgements
(φ ` ψ)→ (σ ` τ) as the statement that there is a morphism of subobjects i∗(σ) ↪→ i∗(τ) in U [φ ≤ ψ].
Definition 6.3. We say U |= pU |= φ ` ψq if the subobject Hom(φ′, ψ′) ↪→ 1 is inhabited.
We will also write U |= (φ ` ψ) for U |= pU |= φ ` ψq.
Theorem 6.4 (Löb). Let U as above, let φ ↪→ 1 be a given proposition (=monomorphism). Then U |= φ ` φ
implies U |= φ.
We will need to verify a number of properties of the implication as defined as above.
Proposition 6.5. If U |= φ then U |= φ
Proof. Immediate from lemma 5.15.
Proposition 6.6. U |= φ ` (φ)
Proof. Apply the functor  = Γ ◦R to φ→ φ.
Proposition 6.7 (Modus Ponens). U |= φ and U |= φ ` ψ then U |= ψ.
Proof. Immediate from the definitions.
Proposition 6.8 (Internal Modus Ponens). U |= ppU |= φ ` ψq→ (φ ` ψ)q.
Proof. Let U [Hom(φ′, ψ′)] = U/Hom(φ′, ψ′) denote the classifying AU of the proposition Hom(φ′, ψ′).
Write out to see that (φ) = Γ(φ′) = Hom(1′, φ′). We have an evaluation map ev : Hom(φ′, ψ′) ×
Hom(1′, φ′)→ Hom(1′, ψ′). Remark that i∗(χ) = Hom(φ′, ψ′)× χ.
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We want to prove that there is an arrow i∗(φ)→ i∗(ψ). We have the following diagram
Hom(φ′, ψ′)×(φ) Hom(φ′, ψ′)×(ψ)
Hom(′φ′, ψ′)
<id,ev>
Hence there is an arrow i∗(φ)→ i∗(ψ).
Proposition 6.9. U |= φ ` ψ and U |= ψ ` χ then U |= φ ` χ
Proof. Immediate.
Proposition 6.10. U |= φ ` ψ and U |= φ→ (ψ ` χ) implies U |= φ ` χ
Proof. Consider the classifying arithmetic universe U [φ] = U/φ. By assumption we have a morphism
a : φ → ψ and a morphism b : i∗ψ = φ × ψ → i∗χ = φ × χ over idφ : φ → φ. The composition
p2 ◦ b◦ < idφ, a >: φ → χ furnishes the required morphism. Here p2 is the projection on the second
coordinate.
We have the following lemma, the AU-incarnation of the diagonalization lemma. It is reminiscent of
Lawvere’s fixed point theorem.
Definition 6.11. Let f : X → X be a map. Let x : 1→ X be a global point. We say x is a fixed point of f
if f(x) := f ◦ x = x.
Lemma 6.12. Let T : P1′ → P1′ be a map in U . Then T has a fixed point.
Proof. Let g be the composition
N× N [1′,N′]× PN′ P1′
N P1′
i×e eval
T∆
g
Construct E as the pullback
E 1
N P1′
True′
By projectivity of 1 we have a lift
N
1 PN′
en
E′
where E′ = R(E), R : U → Ext(U ′). Consider the composition
N ∼= N× 1 Id×n−−−→ N× N f−→ P1′
where f denotes the morphism
N× N i×e−−→ [1′,N′]× PN′ eval−−→ P1
This is equal to g. Finally, the claim is that g(n) is a fixpoint for T . By construction we have f(t, n) = g(t).
Therefore, T (g(n)) = T (f(n, n)) = g(n) by definition of g as the composition in the first square.
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Letφ ↪→ 1be aproposition. Consider theoperatorTφ : P1′ → P1′ definedasTφ(β) = RHom(β,R(φ)).
Apply the diagonalization lemma to obtain the Lob sentence Lφ. It satisfies RHom(R(Lφ), R(φ)) = Lφ.
Recall our formulation of Lob’s theorem:
Theorem 6.13. Let U as above, let φ ↪→ 1 be a given proposition (=monomorphism). Then U |= (U |= φ)→ φ
implies U |= φ.
Proof. 1. Start with L = Lφ : 1 → P1′, the Lob sentence constructed using Lemma 6.12 using the
operator Tφ acting as Tφ(β) = RHom(β), R(φ)) : P1′ → P1′. We have the equivalence Tφ(L) = L.
2. By assumption we have U |= φ ` φ.
3. U |= (pU |= Lq ` φ)→ (pU |= Lq ` φ) by proposition 6.8.
4. U |= pU |= Lq→ (pU |= pU |= Lqq→ pU |= φq by steps 1,3 and proposition 6.9
5. U |= pU |= Lq→ pU |= pU |= φqq by proposition 6.6.
6. U |= pU |= Lq→ pU |= φq by steps 4, 5 and proposition 6.10.
7. U |= pU |= Lq→ φ by steps 2, 6 and proposition 6.9.
8. U |= pU |= pU |= Lq→ φq by Step 7 and proposition 6.5.
9. U |= pU |= Lq by step 1 and proposition 6.7 [Modus Ponens].
10. U |= φ by steps 7, 9 and proposition 6.7 [Modus Ponens].
Remark 6.14. As arithmetic universes are not in general cartesian closed there is no one notion of
implication. In many ways the above discussion merely evaded this issue by looking mostly at entailment.
It would be of interest to investigate novel implication concepts and ascertain whether or not Lob’s
theorem may be proved of them.
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